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Loving Memory: Anamnesis and Hypomnesis
‘[W]e should ask: ti esti to heautou epimeleisthai? (What is it to take care of oneself?)’ (Foucault 2005: 51)
From street names (which often orient us within cultural memory, as much as providing for practical directions) to advertisements (offering us an endless stream of logos, as virtual ‘directions’ within a globalised culture), public sites of reading demonstrate how much of our experience is lived outside of ourselves. These ‘uses of literacy’, and the modes of everyday performance that they entail, pass almost unnoticed as they test our sense of the difference between public and private. Besides such ubiquitous examples, however, this essay focuses on two other sites for public engagement in private contemplation, involving the practice of ‘showing respect’ for a present communion with absence by others: the library and the cemetery. 
Besides both being sanctuaries or guardians of peace and quiet, what might libraries and cemeteries have in common concerning a literacy of social relations that is expressive of a care of self? How might the everyday ‘performance’ practices of each setting invite us to think about those of the other? Or, rather, how might such a comparison shed light on what makes this comparison itself possible: through an analogy, for example, between literacy and death? We may be ‘buried’ in both books and graves, for instance, and both libraries and cemeteries are sites of a play between literal and metaphorical in the meaning of ‘falling asleep’. As in Goya’s allegory, the monsters of the scholar’s mind may awaken while she is slumped over her books; while others may simply succumb to the warmth of the public library as a refuge, particularly when they have no other place to rest; or, finally, there is the euphemistic hope of a future awakening, inscribed and dated on gravestones. Indeed, in its etymology the word cemetery ‘comes from the Greek koimhthrion and its Latin cognate coemeterium, and originally meant a sleeping place, a dormitory’ (Laqueur 2015: 120). What might be at stake here for the care of others, as (of) oneself, in both places’ practice of mnemotechnics – and the social relations that this sustains – not least in relations between the living and the dead? Why might one choose to have a gravestone in the form of a book?[{note}]1
Similar questions are the subject of Armando Petrucci’s historical study of ‘written death’ or the ‘funerary uses of writing’, for example, which examines ‘the problematic nexus constituted by the relationship between the dead and writing’ (Petrucci 1998: xiv); but more significantly here, they underlie Foucault’s revival of philosophical ‘meditation’, in the sense of an ‘an exercise “in thought”’ (Foucault, 2005: 356), which explores this analogy in terms of a preparation for death. From the pre-Socratics to the Stoics, the ‘care of self’ (epimeleia heautou) provides a context for the more familiar Delphic injunction to ‘know thyself’ (gnōthi seauton). But unlike the Socratic sense of an opposition between organic and artificial memory, for the Stoics the meditative ‘appropriation of thought’ was addressed through correspondence as much as in dialogue. It is literally in letters, for the Stoics, that a care of self becomes a ‘self-writing’ (Foucault 1997: 207-222), through the practice of writing-reading (‘reading… extended, reinforced, and reactivated by writing’ [Foucault 2005: 359]). This practice of a care of self – in relation to life situations, of which ‘obviously the most famous example is the meditation of death’ (357) – even comes to form an exemplary library all of its own. Here the sense of ‘loving memory’ opens up a Foucauldian (distinct from Derridean) question of ‘logocentrism’ in modes of understanding ‘something like the Western subject’ (Foucault 2010: 254). Lest one think that this classical ‘hermeneutics of the self’, which grounds an analysis of civic relations of governance (over oneself before any others), is simply an arcane concern of ancient philosophy, we find it addressed every day in journalistic commentary on ‘fitness’ for political office – as, for example, in the case of Donald Trump. 
Although techniques or arts of living (tekhne tou biou), involving the care of self (epimeleia heautou), have – at least, since the Stoics – embraced the practice of writing, the Platonic opposition between living and dead memory (anamnesis and hypomnesis) has, nonetheless, largely prevailed within European culture. Indeed, it is one of the founding paradoxes of philosophy that its love of wisdom has traditionally been rather lacking in love for writing, this being (supposedly) the death of memory. The suspicion of the ‘artificial’ displacing the ‘organic’, of the ‘technical’ displacing the ‘natural’, is even embedded in certain traditions of actor training – where ‘being off the book’, for instance, becomes a key to understanding the work. Indeed, the sense of a care of self – as the preparation for lived experience (as a ‘literacy’ concerning emotion and empathy) – finds a curiously reversed echo in the ambivalence about ‘rehearsed’ feeling and all-too-familiar metaphors of ‘acting’. These hermeneutic practices – as modes of attention, embodied equally by performer and audience – are not, of course, limited to either the dissemblance or resemblance between the world of theatre and the theatre of the world. Transformations of time and place in the experience of silence and stillness, for instance, often occur outside this familiar relation between stage and auditorium. 
The aura of respectful silence prevails, for example, in libraries and cemeteries, suggesting a shared consideration for inner experience (for self-reflection, or ‘anamnesis’, amongst strangers), in relation to a specific mode of exteriority – as the experience of that which asks to be read (‘hypomnesis’). Both settings offer time and space for the practice of attention (a mode of ascesis), not simply towards what is external to oneself (the book and the gravestone), but fundamentally towards one’s own experience of both writing and death. In this relation between, on the one hand, the ‘immortal’ and the ‘immaterial’, and, on the other, the mortal and the remainder(ed), to what does the analogy between books and bodies offer testimony? Both have been subject to veneration and desecration, for example, where the word and the flesh have been understood equally as sacred and profane. As a question of the care of self, the terms anamnesis and hypomnesis do not correspond simply to an opposition between the soul and the body, the loving and the memorial; but rather (as with the literal and the metaphorical here) to an interplay between them – in the very appeal of and to ‘loving memory’. 
Like the scroll or the book – whether made of papyrus, parchment, or paper – the gravestone is an emblem of cultural memory. As the material-support for a mnemotechnics that remains lithic, its appeal is – quite literally – stone-age. Just as we often experience an anguish at the sight of books thrown out of a library and dumped in a skip (and speak of such books being ‘rescued’ or ‘saved’), so there is a pathos of memory when its inscription becomes illegible through the encroachment of – albeit often beautiful – mould, with letters ‘defaced’ by the weather, seemingly no longer cared for. In this case, the possibility of loving memory, and of the social relations that it implies, is touched by illegibility, presaging a greater fear of potential illiteracy and oblivion. Amongst the more disturbing lessons of history, after all, is how easily the metaphor of illegibility becomes an instance of such illiteracy: where the libraries of the dead are no longer honoured, neither are their graves. Indeed, the possibility that the burning of books precedes – rather than replaces – the burning of bodies has now been codified by the International Criminal Court, making the destruction of cultural heritage itself a war crime. This extends the question of care for memory to its ‘objective’ conditions or correlates, and therefore its transmission and survival with respect not only to the past but the future. 
Paying respect and paying attention, equally evoked by visiting cemeteries and libraries, remind us that both places are dedicated to an imagined order of the world, with its internalised regulation of behaviour. In Alberto Manguel’s words, the library – and, I suggest, the cemetery – offers ‘a closed space, a universe of self-serving rules that pretend to replace or translate those of the shapeless universe beyond’ (2006: 12). Here one might recall the eulogy, as if to a grave librarian, given by Clov (in Beckett’s Endgame): ‘I love order. It’s my dream. A world where all would be silent and still and each thing in its last place, under the last dust’ (Beckett 1986: 120). The sense that silence and stillness constitute the behaviour appropriate for this artificial universe – in the faint echo of life lived by spiritual rules (regula vitae) rather than by commercial imperatives – generates superstitions of its own, not least concerning the shifting boundaries between public and private. There is a sense of being at fault when infringing or transgressing the rule of quiet, although this superstition is perhaps more expressive of the analogy here than of an historically accurate description of either setting. No less than many of today’s libraries, the ancient library would have been alive with murmuring, like a beehive; while it is only since the nineteenth century that cemeteries have been subject to an orderly cataloguing of their dead. Even the art of contemplation may prove to be a mask for other motives, considering the active association of death and libraries in murder mysteries (for example, Eco’s Name of the Rose).
Beyond the metaphorical Books of Life and Death (evoked in the Biblical Book of Daniel and Book of Revelation), both libraries and cemeteries have in common Encyclopaedias of the Dead. From the ancient, exemplary ‘Lives’ and monastic libri memoriales (recording names to be recalled during Mass) to modern necrologies (such as varieties of a ‘National Dictionary of Biography’), these encyclopaedias seek to institutionalise the love of memory – in contrast to the numberless dead without ‘name’, as in the eponymous fable by Danilo Kiš (1989). Even in the age of digital records, these documents – examples of what Thomas Laqueur (in his history of the ‘work of the dead’) calls ‘necronominalism’ (Laqueur 2016: 387) – contain not only the names of the deceased, but also the life that feeds on such corpora. With its death-watch beetles, not to mention the proverbial bookworms, the analogue index of here lies has much life in it still, alongside the virtual ‘viruses’ of today. It is only with the literacy that comes from mortality that ‘loving memory’ can be distinguished from ‘data storage’, with the paradoxical combination in each of ‘infinite capacity’ and ‘built-in obsolescence’. As Bernard Stiegler discusses (in terms of ‘symbolic misery’ [2014, 2015]), the meanings of both ‘capacity’ and ‘performance’ are profoundly changed when the analogy between literacy and mortality (in the intergenerational transmission of meaning) is no longer of concern – where the question ‘who cares?’ is merely cynical rather than critical. 
In the relation between libraries and cemeteries, transindividuation may be experienced in its resistance to the ‘[v]alorised, subservient General Intellect, which like its counterpart, the wired and data-ised body, cannot find rest and must always keep moving through the endless expanses of inter-activity’ (Raunig 2016: 18). Here respect for stillness is a recognition that it is perfectly possible (and even desirable) to ‘rest in peace’ – that is, in time – not simply as a transcendental ideal (in death) but as an immanent quality of life. This meditative relation to the body – with respect, for example, to reading – offers an experience of time that is not reduced to intention but is open to questions of ‘mood’, unsettling the division between active and passive through the promise of ‘loving memory’. 
In this context, one might also think of art works that are conceived of in the image of an analogy between books and bodies, to cite only three: Chris Burden’s The Other Vietnam Memorial (1991); Rachel Whiteread’s inverted library (2000), a memorial in Vienna to the city’s murdered Jews; and Anselm Kiefer’s extraordinary book sculptures. In their different ways, the metamorphoses of inner and outer (whether of book or building, body or grave) that they embody are both historical and mythical. With Kiefer, for instance: ‘The books are a geological metaphor for memory: Kiefer uses them as monuments, as storehouses of experience, knowledge and time in accumulated layers, like sedimenting rocks or the superimposed, heterogeneous strata of the earth’ (Lauterwein 2007: 209). These examples evoke the repertoire of a social imaginary in which we still care to be moved by the inanimate and the immaterial through the work of reading-writing, anamnesis and hypomnesis. 
It is commonly said that ‘a room without books is like a body without a soul.’ This apothegm is often attributed directly to Cicero, but in fact offers a nineteenth century paraphrase of a line from his Letters to Atticus. According to the Cicero-Wikiquotes ‘page’, however, the translation of the Latin mens would more usually be ‘mind’, while a twentieth century version (trans. Bailey, 1978: 162) is quoted as saying that the proverbial room is ‘woken to life’ by the presence of books. Here the relation between the life of the body and – or, indeed, as – that of the soul is, precisely, what is in question in this very example of translation; resonating with the relation between the letter and the spirit of a book, or between a room and the ‘life’ of its inhabitant. How and why, after all, does this ancient adage (in Cicero’s name) still make sense to us today, through its questionable translations, despite all the transformations in technology that both separate us from, and yet still link us to, the ‘ancients’? We understand the life of others – their souls or minds – when we know them as readers (in the memory, indeed the love, of writing). But while the analogy between libraries and cemeteries (testifying, ‘in thought’, to this afterlife) concerns mnemotechnics – even ‘remembering’ Cicero by means of the Internet – why is it still the case that reference to an ‘encyclopaedia of the dead’ seems to make sense in a way that a ‘wikipedia of the dead’ does not (yet)? Are we still bound by the Platonic distinction, albeit displaced, between anamnesis and hypomnesis, between the life and the letter of memory? What changes with the medium of this care – in relation to both paper and stone – when the experience of time is inscribed in the new technology of screens?
In the mortuary temple of Rameses II there was, before that of Alexandria, a great library, in the description of which we find a condensation of the relation between literacy and death in various translations into English. In the use of Soul or Mind, for instance, we again encounter the mediation of a Latin translation (by Poggio Bracciolini in 1449) of a Greek text, by Diodorus of Sicily (himself quoting an earlier Greek text by Hecataeus); but in each case what is at issue is care with respect to reading. Diodorus’ citation of the visitor’s experience of Rameses’ mausoleum is rendered, from the Latin, by John Skelton (before 1531) and Henry Cogan (in 1653) as: ‘And there ensiewed after an huge lybrarye wherein was wryton, “The sanatyf remedy of a mannes mynde”’ (1968: 70); and, ‘Next after was the sacred Library, at the entrance whereinto this was written, The Medicine of the Mind' (1653: 34). In more recent translations, but this time of the Greek original, we read: ‘Next comes the sacred library, which bears the inscription “Healing-place of the Soul”’ (Oldfather 1933: 173), and, ‘The next building is the sacred library, upon which are inscribed the words “Balm of the Soul”’ (Murphy 1985: 65). The care of the living here, in proximity to the dead, is figured in its commemorative literacy; that is, in the mnemotechnical relations that underlie common performance practices between the body and the book, logos and techne, anamnesis and hypomnesis. Through the grammatisation of memory and the possibility of loving in absentia, the sense of presence is reflective rather than automated. Here the ‘feedback’ of Siri, for example, will never have the pathos of Echo. The medium-support of and for ‘loving memory’, whether stone, paper, or even algorithm, becomes the affective experience of the subject; at least, for as long as its sense of time and space is still cared for – as was the promise of libraries, and which remains that of cemeteries, in recalling living relations with the dead.[{note}]2

Notes:
1 In the essay-film of which this text is a complement (as if researching ‘in theory’ a work ‘in practice’), Bernard Stiegler discusses precisely an organology of memory, in a juxtaposition with images of gravestones rendered as books – evoking (in their very appeal to it) ‘loving memory’. This mode of attention, as an historical form of an art of individuation, is the practice that animates the analogy between bodies and books that is figured in the film’s visiting a cemetery. The sonorities of the transcriptions of Bach by György Kurtág, which alternate with those of Stiegler’s own voice, echo – in concert music rather than church music – a tradition of ‘psychopannychism’ (a Protestant understanding of the dead being at rest before the Day of Judgment, their souls asleep rather than prey to the commerce of the Catholic church’s indulgences [Laqueur 2015: 59]). In the relation between performance and recording (as, precisely, between its anamnesis and hypomnesis), there is a sense of lullaby that is audible (I feel) in the duet playing of the composer and his wife, with an aura of loving memory suggestive of care rather than a religiose sentimentality. To view the film (in English): https://vimeo.com/104801436 (​https:​/​​/​vimeo.com​/​104801436​); and (in a slightly different, French version): https://vimeo.com/105036743 (​https:​/​​/​vimeo.com​/​105036743​).
2 This essay is dedicated, in loving memory, to my mother, my maternal grandparents and great uncle, who are all buried at Mill Hill cemetery (although none of them beneath books), where the photographs were taken.
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